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Culture and Procedural Justice in Transitioning Societies 
 
Landon E. Hancock and Tamra Pearson d’Estrée 
 
Abstract 
In any transitional justice mechanism there are tradeoffs between the search for 
retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished. To date, 
this tension has been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of 
justice, which the authors argue are limited in the extent to which they can explain why 
certain mechanisms—such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission or 
Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful. We argue that mechanisms 
that have a high overlap between local culture and elements of procedural justice are 
perceived as more fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be 
burdened—by their operation. 
 
Introduction 
Though justice mechanisms seek to hold wrongdoers accountable and deter future 
wrongdoing, societies transitioning after violent conflict may have multiple goals for 
their justice processes. Transitional justice refers to efforts made by states and/or the 
international community to address criminal acts and human rights abuses of former 
regimes during a transition from one regime to another (Gloppen 2005; Teitel 2000). 
Individual mechanisms of transitional justice differ greatly, from tribunals to truth 
commissions or even including indigenous forms and informal processes (Biggar 2003; 
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Minow 1998). The reputed success or failure of these differing mechanisms has much to 
do with the overall perceptions of the local populace. But what are the sources of these 
perceptions? In any transitional justice mechanism there are often tradeoffs between the 
search for retributive justice and the practical limitations on what can be accomplished in 
the post-conflict arena (Biggar 2003; Minow 1998; Teitel 2000). To date, this tension has 
been discussed in reference to internationally established norms of distributive justice; 
such norms are limited in the extent to which they can explain why mechanisms outside 
formal tribunals—such as South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) or 
Rwanda’s gacaca courts—have been considered successful (Sriram 2007; Uvin and 
Mironko 2003; Wilson 2003). 
In order to understand perceptions of success or failure of particular transitional 
justice mechanisms at the local level, this article will examine the nexus between local 
cultural traditions and the perception of procedural justice embodied in those particular 
mechanisms used. We argue that where there is a high overlap between local expressions 
and perceptions of procedural justice, individual mechanisms will be perceived as more 
fair and just, even to those who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their 
operation. 
Goals of Transitional Justice 
What are the goals of transitional justice? The primary goal of transitional justice 
is to allow a country that has been plagued by human rights abuses to address them in a 
manner that allows the country to move forward into a time of peace and development 
rather than to stay trapped in a past characterized by violence and hatred (Amstutz 2005; 
Hayner 2002; Minow 1998; Teitel 2000; Quinn 2009; Nolan 2007; Gloppen 2005). 
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Within this overarching goal are a number of assertions about how to successfully draw a 
line in time and move into a new future. One is the argument that in order to address the 
past, justice must be served and punishment must be meted out to all perpetrators of 
human rights abuses. Set against this argument is the idea that—for a variety of 
reasons—justice is often unobtainable and the goal should instead be a full accounting of 
the past in order to validate the experiences of the victims and to bring as many of the 
crimes as possible out into the light of day. Additional goals include the sanctioning of 
officials of the former regime—possibly through lustrations or fines—and the repair of 
harm to victims, possibly through official apologies and/or reparations or restitution. 
Perceptions of Success & Failure 
Societies attempt to address or meet the multiple goals of transitional justice 
through using one or more of a variety of mechanisms available, including tribunals, truth 
commissions and local mechanisms. As we begin our analysis of perceptions of success 
or failure for individual transitional justice mechanisms it is important to establish our 
method for measuring those perceptions. Overall three generally recognized elements go 
into a perception that a particular transitional justice mechanism is fair. The first two are 
focused on the outcomes; retributive justice, which is focused on adequate sanctions, and 
distributive justice, which is typically focused on the allocation of resources. The third is 
known as procedural justice and focuses on the fairness of how decisions are made (Tyler 
and Smith 1998). Psychological research in procedural justice has shown that people are 
often more concerned with how they are treated during a judicial proceeding than with 
whether or not they receive their desired outcomes, showing that individuals are more 
likely to accept adverse outcomes if they believe that the procedures used to achieve 
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those outcomes were fair (Tyler 2000). Rather than relying upon legal definitions of 
procedural justice, we will be applying international and local cultural criteria to 
recognized elements of social psychological frameworks of procedural justice; these 
criteria will be fleshed out in more detail below. 
Like many complex issues, the determination of success or failure for individual 
transitional justice mechanisms depends upon the perspective of those standing in 
judgment. Expanding on Mertius’ (2000) concept of different constituents for transitional 
justice mechanisms we could define potential constituents whose perspective on justice 
we need to consider to include the following: the victims of the human rights abuses, 
those accused of perpetrating the abuses, local elites, local populations not directly 
affected by the abuses, and the international community as represented by international 
legal organs, non-governmental organizations and international governmental 
organizations. It is clear that each of these constituencies might have a different 
perspective on whether or not an individual mechanism meets their standards for success 
and how well they do so. 
For the international community, and for many legal scholars, the perceptions of 
success for any particular transitional justice mechanism not only rely upon the outcomes 
in terms of individuals prosecuted or people reconciled, but they also focus on the 
fairness of the procedures used. Social psychological research confirms that justice 
judgments include both outcome and procedural components, with procedural concerns at 
least of equal, if not more, importance than outcomes. For example, some legal scholars 
critique Rwanda’s gacaca system because it does not provide adequate legal protections 
for both the accused and for prosecution witnesses (Corey 2004; Daly 2002; Lahiri 2009; 
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Rettig 2008). These critics use what they consider to be a universal standard for fair 
procedures, which seems to also include the assumption that courts are needed to channel 
the natural desire for revenge (Jacoby 1983). 
By contrast, to outsiders it may appear that grassroots support for, or 
condemnation of, a particular transitional justice mechanism may have more to do with 
its outcomes, either retributive or distributive, than its procedures. The question of 
whether perceptions of outcome fairness or procedural fairness dominate a “folk” 
conception of what is important to local populations, local elites, victims and bystanders 
is an important one in helping to determine what has worked in transitional justice, why it 
may have worked, and how multiple mechanisms may be integrated to address both 
procedural and outcome needs where possible.  
 
Culture and Procedure in Transitional Justice 
The issue of culture as expressed through legal traditions is one that has been 
largely ignored by the academic community in its study of transitional justice. With the 
exception of a few scholars (Falk 2003; Fletcher, Weinstein, and Rowen 2009; Miller 
2006), questions of the fit of transitional justice mechanisms with local legal traditions 
are rarely asked. Many argue that retributive justice is the universal preference, with 
restorative mechanisms used only when conditions prohibit the use of trials and other 
forms of retributive justice. Others have argued that restorative justice provides benefits 
for the victims of these crimes that retributive justice cannot; with the retributive justice 
argument often framed as a moral dilemma and the restorative justice argument as a 
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method of achieving the goals of transitional justice alongside the recognition of political 
necessity (Hirsch 2007; Leebaw 2003; Minow 1998). 
One method to address the question of cultural fit of transitional justice 
mechanisms with existing legal traditions is to examine them within a framework of 
procedural justice. Procedural justice provides a promising avenue for inquiry because 
research has shown that people are often more concerned with how they are treated—
how fair they perceive the process to be—than they are concerned about outcomes. In 
other words, individuals are more likely to accept sub-optimal outcomes for themselves if 
they believe that the processes used to achieve those outcomes were fair (Tyler 2000). In 
the psychological realm procedural justice is characterized by the study of the extent to 
which individuals have control over or an impact on judicial processes and the extent and 
nature of control over decisions made in the judicial context (Thibaut and Walker 1975). 
Several sets of criteria have been enumerated for the study of procedural justice, 
however, work done by social psychologist Tom Tyler (1988, 2000, 2006, 2009), widely 
recognized as an authority on the subjects of procedural justice, trust and legitimacy, 
focuses on four interlocking concepts of the neutrality of the forum, the trustworthiness 
of the authorities, treatment with dignity and respect, and the opportunity for participation 
or voice.  
Tyler considers procedural justice concerns to be universal, although studies show 
that the meaning of justice can “vary depending on the nature of the dispute or the 
allocation involved” (Tyler 1988, 107). While the work done by Tyler and others focuses 
on basic settings—formal versus cooperative—one could reasonably extrapolate that, like 
distributive justice, the meaning of procedural justice could also depend upon the local 
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traditional context within which it is embedded. Tyler looks at courts versus police to 
create his typology of more formal to less formal—or more cooperative. This work seeks 
to shift the contextual debate to examine forums based upon folk or traditional 
conceptions of procedural justice as opposed to more formal conceptions of procedural 
justice usually characterized by formal court settings and the trappings recognizable by 
most readers from industrialized states. 
Procedural justice concerns seem to be shared at the level of the society, as norms, 
rather than determined by individual preference. Tyler’s work showed that individual 
characteristics had no impact upon criteria used to assess procedural justice, suggesting 
“definitions of the meaning of justice within particular settings may be part of the cultural 
beliefs shared by members of [that] society” (Tyler 1988, 132). This cultural congruity 
within a context also facilitates acceptance of decisions made in these settings since it is 
likely that parties will share a conception of procedural justice. Shared conceptions of a 
just process will lead to shared acceptance of the outcomes as just. 
Although one could argue that comparing transitional justice mechanisms like 
South Africa’s TRC and Rwanda’s gacaca courts is a bit like comparing apples to 
oranges, we feel that the use of procedural justice criteria, when viewed through the lens 
of cultural congruency, can tell us something about why those who accepted these venues 
as valid did so, as well as shed light on why these venues were rejected by others. Overall 
we understand that, even though each transitional justice mechanism was designed to 
promote reconciliation to a greater or lesser degree, it is difficult to measure both 
mechanisms by the same standards of retributive or distributive justice because they were 
each designed to have different outcomes; with one focused on storytelling and the other 
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on restitution and punishment. However, as outlined by Thibaut and Walker, Leventhal, 
Tyler and those in alternative dispute resolution (ADR), the process by which parties 
attempt to resolve their differences may in fact be more important than the outcome of 
winning or losing (Tyler and Smith 1998, 601; Vidmar 1992, 224). Koh found that 
Tyler’s and Leventhal’s criteria were present in mediation, noting that “[p]rocedural 
justice is immeasurably important in both mediation and litigation in determining the 
participating party’s satisfaction and likely adherence to the results” (Koh 2004, 176). We 
argue that if one can successfully compare judicial and non-judicial forums by using 
procedural justice criteria as Koh has done, then it should be eminently possible to do so 
with transitional justice forums like the TRC and gacaca. 
International or Formal Conceptions of Procedural Justice 
Most studies of procedural justice have been undertaken in Western societies and 
have largely concerned themselves with the interactions of individuals with criminal 
justice systems—either in formal court settings or in more informal interactions with law 
enforcement (Hauenstein, McGonigle, and Flinder 2001, 40-41)—or with group decision-
making in organizational settings (Paese, Lind, and Kanfer, 1988). Individuals within a 
given society are usually aware of society’s norms of procedural justice and use these 
norms to assess their own or other’s interactions with decision groups or authorities 
(Tyler 1988, 132). Given the dominant legalistic and individualistic culture of the West, 
particularly the United States, Western norms tend to place high value on formal 
processes that stress the neutrality of decision-making forums and the protection of civil 
rights for the accused (Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004). Criticisms of alternative forums such 
as gacaca most often come from political and legal arenas and are largely concerned with 
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the unwillingness or inability of these forums to provide for an adequate defense for the 
accused, a lack of legal training for judges, prosecutors and the like, and a possible lack 
of equality in punishment for offenders (Amnesty International 2002; Betts 2005; Brown 
2010; Clark 2010; Corey 2004; Uvin 2000; Megwalu and Loizides 2010). These legal 
criteria for justice processes are not the same as what social psychological research tells 
us is important to most participants in justice proceedings. There the priorities are those 
identified above, the neutrality of the forum, trustworthiness of the authorities, perception 
of treatment with dignity and respect, and the opportunity for participation or voice. In 
addition, while the importance of procedural justice can be found across cultural contexts, 
the shape of what is considered to be procedurally just may vary according to particular 
context (Lind and Earley 1992; Morris and Leung 2000).  
Folk or Local Conceptions of Procedural Justice 
Morris and Leung’s (2000) review of social psychological research in justice 
shows that while cultural dimensions of a society (collectivist vs. individualist) can have 
an impact on perceptions of distributive fairness, cross cultural evidence suggests that 
procedural justice perceptions are determined by the same, or similar, perceptions of 
fairness that characterized Thibaut and Walker’s original studies. Their review points out 
that in diverse, largely northern societies, criteria of having a voice in the process, 
perceiving concern by the authorities, and receiving treatment with dignity and respect all 
played important roles in the perception of procedural justice felt by disputants in public 
and private settings (Morris and Leung 2000, 115). Given these findings we believe that a 
fruitful starting point for our analysis is to examine the cultural expressions of Tyler’s 
four elements of procedural justice, outlined above, in each of our case studies. As an 
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example, one of the defining features of South Africa’s TRC was its provision for public 
hearings, which, in Hayner’s estimation helped shift the TRC’s “focus from product (its 
final report) to process, engaging the public as an audience and encouraging press 
coverage of its issues over a longer period of time. A transparent process also helps to 
assure the public that there is no cover-up of the evidence, nor a blatant political bias in 
the commission’s work” (Hayner 2002, 225, emphasis in original). Such a transparent 
process encouraged trust in the authorities, provided voice to victims, and showed parties 
being treated with dignity and respect. We will engage in similar investigation with two 
transitional justice mechanisms: Rwanda’s gacaca and South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. 
Culture and Process in the TRC 
South Africa experienced thirty years of armed resistance against its Apartheid 
regime and during this process the country suffered from massacres, killings and severe 
discriminatory policies against its majority non-white population. After the election of 
Nelson Mandela in 1994, with the considerable input of civil society members, the South 
African Parliament passed the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act in 
mid-1995 and with the lead of Archbishop Desmond Tutu the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was inaugurated in December 1995 (Hayner 2002, 40-41). 
The goals of TRC were to grant amnesty to those who made a full disclosure of their 
crimes, to give both victims and perpetrators a say in determining the truth, to restore the 
human dignity, to make recommendations to Parliament on rehabilitation and reparation 
issues; and in the long-run to help heal the victims, society and to create a new culture of 
respect for human rights (Borris 2002, 165; van Zyl 1999, 654). To assist in meeting 
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these objectives, the legislation established three committees within the TRC: the Human 
Rights Violations Committee (HRVC), the Amnesty Committee (AC) and the Reparation 
and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) (van Zyl 1999, 654). Although the TRC did not 
have the power to punish people, it did not provide a blanket amnesty to all human rights 
violators. Since hearings were public, embarrassment, shame, remorse and 
marginalization from society became a sort of punishment under the exercise of the TRC 
(van Zyl 1999, 662). 
The three committees each had a different mandate and each approached its 
mandate in a different fashion regarding those procedural justice elements that were 
incorporated into its processes. However, all three committees were informed by the 
tenets of restorative justice and used an adaptation of a Xosa proverb known as ubuntu.  
The meaning of ubuntu comes from the root of a Zulu-Xhosa word, or proverb, 
which means that “a human being is a human being only through its relationship to other 
human beings” (Marx 2002, 52). Essentially it is a description of humans as belonging to 
a community and defining individual good within communal good. Marx is skeptical 
about the origins of ubuntu and whether it does actually represent a truly African way of 
being, as opposed to what he describes as its original meaning, a sense of hospitality and 
the welcoming and integration of strangers (Marx 2002, 52). Regardless of its etymology, 
the fact remains that ubuntu has been presented as an African mode of thought that places 
community harmony above individual self-interest, based on the notion—whether real or 
mythologized—that citizens of the New South Africa should think of the nation as a 
larger community. The downside, as Marx sees it, is that by focusing on communal good 
over individual good, ubuntu enforces conformity, and legitimizes the policies of 
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addressing reparations through structural changes to society rather than through help to 
individual victims (Marx 2002, 54). 
In contrast to Marx’ skepticism regarding ubuntu, Antjie Krog insists that it is not 
just a belief in communal harmony that enforces conformity, but is instead provides the 
cultural foundation upon which rests the popular understanding of the use of and need for 
reconciliation as a central part of the TRC. Krog’s view of ubuntu is one that focuses on 
the interconnectedness of individuals, describing the feeling of ubuntu as 
“interconnectedness-towards-wholeness” in order to argue that the TRC rested on a 
foundation of a desire towards wholeness which led to a willingness by many victims to 
offer forgiveness as a step towards restoring humanity to perpetrators and to themselves 
(Krog 2008a, 2008b). 
The question remains as to the precise role of ubuntu: was it a foundation of the 
TRC, generating and sustaining a desire towards wholeness and forgiveness? Was it an 
instrument that the TRC used to build a new nation, squashing, in the process, the natural 
desire of victims for retribution? Or was it a cultural embodiment for elements of 
procedural justice; a manner though which the TRC could show its respect for the parties 
who came before them and give voice to their pain while, hopefully, engendering trust 
and respect for both the TRC itself and the new dispensation at large. Before attempting 
to answer this question, we turn to Rwanda’s gacaca courts. 
Culture and Process in Gacaca 
Violence between Hutu and Tutsi groups peaked in 1994 with a genocide of 
Tutsis in Rwanda that left over 800,000 dead and over 130,000 in prison on suspicion of 
committing acts of genocide. Even though there was a desire to bring justice to the 
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victims and to hold the perpetrators accountable, a sense of impunity persisted in 
Rwanda. “With [its] judicial infrastructure destroyed and most prosecutors and judges 
killed in 1994, there was no chance that [Rwanda’s] national court system could 
prosecute all those responsible for such crimes” (Tiemessen 2004, 57-58).  
Gacaca courts were established as a response to the ineffectiveness of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and national court system to address 
this backlog of untried genocide cases. In 2001, Rwandans elected approximately 
255,000 people to act as judges in these courts. “The process of Gacaca is derived from 
traditional Rwandan community courts, in which the elders would sit on the grass—
Gacaca is the Kinyarwandan word for grass—and resolve community conflicts” (Daly 
2002, 356). Village elders and community members gather together on a patch of grass to 
discuss civil disputes and elders present a resolution to the issue in an effort to salvage 
social peace and cohesion in the village. The primary aim of traditional gacaca was to 
restore social harmony and secondarily to mete out punishments (Nagy 2009, 99). 
Traditional uses were for resolving personal, land, marital and inheritance disputes (Betts 
2005, 743). Apuuli notes that the type of justice practiced in traditional gacaca was an 
unmediated folk or popular justice that depended upon a “common sense understanding 
rather than upon law;” modern gacaca represents a mediated form of this type of justice 
wherein the participants are more constrained by the apparatus of the state (Apuuli 2009, 
14-15). 
The modern gacaca process differs from its traditional forebears in three key 
aspects: The traditional process was voluntary, the traditional process was concerned with 
local civil and community issues and the traditional process gave community leaders 
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more leeway to decide individual punishments (Corey 2004, 82). Modern gacaca is a 
state-sponsored program, with attendance required by all community members. Unlike its 
traditional brethren, modern gacaca addresses criminal and civil crimes associated with 
the genocide. Under its initial inception, modern gacaca was concerned with what were 
known as category 2, 3 or 4 crimes under the 1996 Organic Law—category 1 crimes 
were largely reserved for those who plotted or mastermined the genocide with the other 
categories reserved for those who committed murder, serious nonlethal assaults or 
property offenses (Lahiri 2009, 323). Initially the judges were given wide latitude in 
sentencing and were allowed give life sentences for some crimes. A 2004 amendment 
from the law combined categories 2 and 3 and limited the maximum penalty to thirty 
years imprisonment (Corey 2004, 82-83; Lahiri 2009, 325-326). 
Traditional and modern gacaca share some clear similarities, including the 
participation of the whole community in the process, a focus on community healing 
rather than just punishment, and the use of a plea bargaining mechanism to encourage 
truth telling with the goal of reconciliation rather than just punishment (Vandeginste 
2003, 271). Additionally, much of the modern gacaca process derives from its traditional 
forebear. This includes the open-air setting where, unlike a formal court proceeding, 
everyone in attendance is allowed to fully participate. This means that judges, the 
accused, accuser(s) and all those present can speak out, question those giving testimony 
and otherwise interject their opinions. Any of the testimony can be used in determining 
guilt or innocence and there was no initial requirement for physical evidence (Corey 
2004, 83). Recent changes in procedure have meant that the gathering of evidence is 
based less on hearsay and more on information gathering by local administrators assigned 
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to assist the gacaca judges. This information is then verified by the assembled 
populations, although individuals are still allowed to speak against or in defense of any 
person as well as ask questions (Nagy 2009, 93-94). 
Another important aspect of gacaca are the extensive provisions made for plea 
bargaining. Provisions have been written into the gacaca law that allow for major 
reductions of sentences for those who confess either before the trial begins or before a 
verdict has been reached. Clark argues that the gacaca system facilitates reconciliation 
through its plea bargaining system, which reintegrates perpetrators back into the 
community through service—often alongside and in service of survivors and victims—as 
well as direct compensation to victims and survivors (Clark 2009, 315).  
Overall, modern gacaca was designed by Rwanda’s government to largely 
resemble its traditional forebear, with processes rooted in traditional gacaca and, thus, 
highly recognizable to the local population (Betts 2005, 743). However, as we will see 
below, there are serious critiques of both gacaca and the TRC processes as being unfair to 
defendants and/or victims. As we move to the next section, we will begin analyzing both 
the practices of gacaca and those of the TRC in order to determine the extent to which 
they correspond to established categories of psychological procedural justice. 
 
Judging Success Based on Process 
We are examining cultural expressions of transitional justice in order to determine 
the extent to which they correspond to established categories of psychological procedural 
justice. Our argument is that the higher the overlap between the processes of transitional 
justice mechanisms and local cultural expressions of procedural justice, the more that 
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such mechanisms will be perceived as fair and just by local populations, even by those 
who may not benefit—or indeed may be burdened—by their operation. Our analysis 
relies primarily upon Tyler’s four criteria to examine both the South African TRC and 
Rwanda’s gacaca in order to determine the extent to which their culturally-based 
processes fulfill the criteria of procedural justice. 
The four criteria identified by procedural justice research outlined above and used 
in this analysis are neutrality, the trustworthiness of the authorities, treatment with dignity 
and respect, and the opportunity for participation or voice. In each case, these criteria are 
examined at two levels; the formal/international and folk/local. When we operationalize 
these concepts at both levels we are generally looking for different indicators. At the 
formal or international level we are generally looking for indicators that are usually 
present in judicial systems based on a “Western” notion of fair procedures and 
protections for the accused. At the folk or local level we might be looking for something 
slightly different. As opposed to a Western conception of justice, which concentrates on 
the rights of the accused and views criminal actions as harming the state, we might find 
indicators that community harmony would be more valued or that group norms might 
lead people to accept processes that are based more on informal understandings of fair 
treatment and less on codified rules of evidence, disclosure or procedure (Barton et al. 
1983; Nader and Todd 1978; Zartman 2000b). Our understanding is that informal 
procedures which place a higher value on community cohesiveness and collective good 
over individual rights may be more acceptable when those procedures are embedded 
within or derive from cultural constructs which are highly valued in the local culture. 
This does not imply that everyone will be satisfied, but it is more likely that larger 
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portions of the local population will find these processes acceptable because they derive 
from local traditions. 
Neutrality 
We use Tyler’s definition of neutrality, which is focused on participants’ 
“judgments about the honesty, impartiality, and objectivity” of those in charge of the 
decision making mechanism in question, in this case, the transitional justice process. 
Tyler’s research showed that participants believed that these authority figures should not 
be swayed by personal values and biases (Tyler 2000, 118, 122). This criterion appears to 
converge with Leventhal’s criteria of the ability to suppress bias, the quality or accuracy 
of the decisions made, the ability to correct unfair or inaccurate decisions and the degree 
to which the process meets standards of fairness and morality (Leventhal 1980). 
Neutrality as viewed through formal or international conceptions of procedural 
justice is most embodied by the sets of rules and procedures that ensure that the accused 
have the ability to mount the best defense possible and have some likelihood of being 
acquitted of their charges, especially if they are not guilty. The Nuremberg Tribunal is 
often cited as one of the best examples of a transitional justice mechanism where the 
authorities, in this case the judges, acted with a high level of neutrality; largely because 
they found three defendants innocent of the charges brought against them. 
Neutrality at the folk or popular justice level, by contrast, is much less clear in 
terms of the procedures that traditional institutions should undertake in order to assure 
claimants or defendants that the judges or arbiters will treat all sides equally. Much as in 
the difference between acceptable mediators in Western societies requiring some sort of 
training or certification and mediators in traditional societies requiring some sort of social 
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position, either elected or not, in order to be acceptable to the parties (Moore 2003), it 
appears that the difference between judges in formal systems and judges in informal 
systems depends, on the one hand, the training and knowledge of the individual and, on 
the other hand, the social acceptability of the individual. While this is not exactly 
analogous it appears that informal—folk or popular justice systems—tend to rely more 
upon the social acceptability of the individual arbiters than upon codified procedures that 
protect the rights of individuals. Instead these arbiters are assumed to have the best 
interests of the community at heart and, unless they prove otherwise through their 
actions, they will generally be accorded a level of trust that goes along with their 
presumed neutrality (Barton et al. 1983; Zartman 2000a). 
We found that the South African TRC has somewhat strong indicators for 
neutrality of the forum and its commissioners, but there were a few problems. Two 
possible standards can be applied: Western procedural justice standards on the one hand, 
and cultural procedural justice standards based on ubuntu on the other. By Western 
standards the emphasis of the Amnesty Commission on granting amnesty, particularly the 
preference for witness testimony favoring amnesty over that favoring prosecution, calls 
into question the neutrality of the forum and of the commissioners. However, when 
judged through the lens of ubuntu, with its preference on social restoration over 
individual retribution, one could reasonably argue that the AC’s neutrality was focused 
on communal over individual good. Despite this argument, however, the fact that 
ubuntu—as popular as it might be—was not universally accepted as a standard by which 
justice should be measured, gives rise to survey evidence that showed most South 
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Africans felt that the amnesty provisions of the TRC were unfair to victims (Gibson 
2002). 
The Human Rights Violations Commission (HRVC), through the explicit focus of 
its creating act on the needs of victims, was seen as partial to their needs, leaning more 
heavily towards providing voice, dignity and respect to victims than towards presenting 
an image of neutrality (Chapman and Van der Merwe 2008; De Lange 2000; Garkawe 
2003). In this arena the ideals of ubuntu required fidelity to compassion for victims of 
Apartheid and to healing the community through affirming their individual experiences. 
By eschewing a legal-forensic definition of the truth and distancing themselves from 
formal conception of neutrality, the HRVC adhered to those elements of procedural 
justice that were more congruent with the characterization of ubuntu as focusing on the 
interdependence of healing and forgiveness as cornerstones of reconciliation (Krog 
2008b). Unlike the issues raised by the AC’s emphasis on amnesty, the relative lack of 
importance accorded to neutrality by the HRVC was not seen as a major problem by most 
in South African society, who indicated that they overwhelmingly felt that the TRC had 
done a good job of helping victims by letting families know what had happened to their 
loved ones (Gibson 2005, 346). However, as will be seen below, the necessity for a level 
of selectivity did give rise to issues around equal access and the ability of all who wished 
to tell their stories having the ability to do so, somewhat damaging the perception of 
neutrality of the Commission’s choice of stories to hear publicly. 
Shifting to consider the procedural justice criteria in the gacaca courts of Rwanda, 
there are several deficiencies that lead to low perceived neutrality regardless of whether 
we use a Western or local lens. First, despite its prominence on the local level, gacaca is 
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still a state-sponsored process and was perceived to be subject to state pressure. Second, 
it has been seen by some as a form of victor’s justice, especially when one considers that 
Tutsi members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) accused of massacres are excluded 
from the possibility of prosecution (Corey 2004, 86; Tiemessen 2004, 65). In addition to 
this danger, Uvin and Mironko argue that many genocide survivors do not testify for fear 
of revenge and victims of rape refuse to testify because such issues are not made public in 
Rwandan culture (Uvin and Mironko 2003, 227). Additionally, where there were few 
available survivors, people gave false testimony without fear of being exposed by other 
witnesses, and when survivors did testify they often ran the risk of re-traumatization 
(Uvin and Mironko 2003, 227). Other critiques of gacaca stem largely from the 
international perspective and the expectation that any trial system should provide justice 
based upon Western standards such as the rights to representation, a speedy trial, 
reasonable detention times and conditions. Uvin contends that the failure to meet these 
conditions violates the defendants human rights, although he observed that “many people 
among the general population seem…in favor of the Gacaca system” (Uvin 2000, 6).  
Daly (2002) notes that, at least in 2002, there was widespread support for gacaca, 
with a number of independent surveys reporting support as high as 80 percent and higher 
among Rwanda’s prison population, the people who would be the most directly affected 
by the new courts. However, as with other aspects of criticism of gacaca there are some 
concerns that opponents would not be willing to express their opposition. In a public 
statement issued on January 23, 2006, Amnesty International criticized the Rwandan 
Government and expressed concerns over the intimidation and harassment of 
Bonaventure Bizumuremyi, editor of the independent newspaper Umuco, who had used 
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his paper to criticize the government for tightly controlling the judiciary. A colleague of 
Bizumuremyi’s, Jean Léonard Rugambage was arrested and accused of being a 
génocidaire after he authored an article alleging that gacaca judges had used their 
positions for personal gain and to “settle personal feuds.” These critiques lead one to 
question the neutrality of the forum and the extent to which opposition to gacaca, both 
within and without the actual process, is allowed free expression. An indicator of falling 
support for gacaca, and perhaps the perception of its reduced neutrality, is the fact that 
recent studies have shown that forced attendance and information campaigns are now 
required to increase participation, whereas attendance and support was initially quite high 
(Nagy 2009, 95). 
In Longman’s eyes one potentially serious problem with the neutrality of gacaca 
is the dual role played by judges at the lowest (category 4) level who serve both as judges 
and as investigating prosecutors. This is most serious during the pre-trial phase when the 
investigating judges have some technical assistance from the state that the defendant does 
not (Longman 2006, 219). However, he counters that there are two factors that mitigate 
against this preventing an adequate defense on the part of the accused. The first is that, 
like the defendant, the judges are not legal experts; meaning that the court would be 
tipped too far in the defendant’s favor if he or she was allowed to hire an attorney while 
no one else had access to one. The second mitigating factor is the inclusion of the entire 
community in the process where, presumably, supporters and family members of the 
defendant would be able to speak on his or her behalf (Longman 2006, 218). 
To summarize, each of these critiques, especially when placed alongside the 
concerns that Tutsi crimes are not being brought to trial along with the contention that 
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gacaca is being used to cement the power of the RPF government, violate Tyler’s criteria 
for procedural justice, namely, they contravene the perceived neutrality of the forum and 
the trustworthiness of the authorities. 
As noted, attendance at some sessions has been diminishing, with various reasons 
being given for the loss. Some reasons center around procedural justice issues, namely 
the sense that gacaca is not neutral because it only addresses Hutu crimes and not Tutsi 
ones, particularly those carried out by the RPF. Other issues raised have to do with the 
time required of people who would otherwise be tending their farms or engaging in the 
labor necessary to live. Clark notes that community-level gacaca sessions often take up a 
whole day and that some survivors still feel too traumatized to participate or fear 
retribution if they speak out (Clark 2009, 318). Part of this may be due to an initial lack 
of communication by the government about why prisoners were being released, 
generating confusion, uncertainty and fear; leaving some Rwandans feeling that the 
government is asking too much of them and providing too little in the way of a supportive 
environment for their participation (Clark 2009, 319). 
In overall terms we can see that the TRC does well in terms of neutrality of the 
forum, though not without its detractors. The perception that both the AC and HRVC 
were neutral depends largely upon viewing them through the lens of ubuntu as a 
foundation for South African (or at least black South African) society (Krog 2008a, 
2008b). The alternative view of ubuntu, that it was largely a nation-building exercise 
designed to convince black South Africans to give up their rights (Coertze 2001; Marx 
2002; Wilson 2001), could be characterized as a Western view of ubuntu, parallel to a 
Western or formal view of the TRC as failing to meet legal criteria of procedural justice 
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rather than psychological criteria. In shifting our view of the TRC to one characterized by 
ubuntu we can, as Krog intimates, see that some subsequent disappointment with the 
TRC may come from a failure of those pardoned to abide by the tenets of ubuntu rather 
than disappointment that they did not receive adequate punishment (Krog 2008a, 218-
219). 
By contrast we can see serious deficiencies in the perceived neutrality of 
Rwanda’s gacaca courts whether we view them through a formal lens or through a folk 
lens which, presumably, values this traditional method of resolving disputes and places 
less importance upon the legal criteria of procedural justice. From the unwillingness of 
the Rwandan government to consider Tutsi crimes to allegations that defendants were 
browbeaten or not allowed to cross-examine witnesses, it appears that the neutrality of 
the gacaca forum was seriously compromised (Amnesty International 2002, 24-25). That 
these issues were seen as serious by ordinary Rwandans could be deduced from the need 
to shift from voluntary attendance to mandatory attendance, often requiring authorities to 
round up community members who were either unaware of the gacaca session or, more 
likely, had chosen not to attend (Amnesty International 2002; Clark 2009). The additional 
problems alluded to above, the dual role of some judges, the lack of legal representation 
for defendants, and the pressure to plead guilty in return for lesser sentences, are more of 
a concern to the international community with its formal conception of procedural justice. 
However, these problems may also take on a more serious role to ordinary Rwandans 
given the problems with neutrality at the folk level.  
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Trustworthiness 
According to Tyler people judge the trustworthiness of authorities by “whether 
the person is benevolent and caring, is concerned about their situation and their concerns 
and needs, considers their arguments, tries to do what is right for them, and tries to be 
fair” (Tyler 2000, 122). A key indicator of trustworthiness is the willingness of 
authorities to justify their decisions by giving an account of how they reached them. In 
this sense those arbiters that move from mere neutrality to having their decisions 
respected as authoritative have, in Tyler’s estimation, established some trust with those 
whom their decisions affect. In some cases it appears that this trustworthiness can be 
applied to a category of people while in others it is applied to those who have 
“particularized personal connections” such as a neighborhood police officer, pastor or 
tribal elder (Tyler 2000, 122). Here we can see a potential differentiation between the 
Western conception of an arbiter who is trustworthy because of his or her position and a 
traditional conception of someone who is trustworthy because of his or her personal 
characteristics (Moore 2003). When authorities have established this sort of legitimacy, 
people no longer feel the need to inspect every decision, every outcome, because they 
trust the process and the authority to do right. 
In the case of the TRC the commissioners needed to appear trustworthy to 
victims, survivors and to those who applied for amnesty. In particular, Archbishop Tutu 
appeared to be genuinely concerned and caring for the welfare of those victims and 
survivors who testified before the HRVC, often sharing their emotional pain and 
affirming their willingness to speak to the commission and share their stories (Shore and 
Kline 2006). As Tyler notes a key element of appearing trustworthy for authorities is the 
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justification of their decisions (Tyler 2000, 122). Given that the HRVC did not make 
decisions except in regard to selecting cases for public hearing, it seems that the 
justification of decisions is less relevant in this case. However, the AC did justify its 
decisions to grant or deny amnesty to those applicants who testified in public before it, 
strengthening the trustworthiness of that committee.  
It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of the Reparations and Rehabilitation 
Committee (RRC) in terms of trustworthiness because they were relegated to an advisory 
body and held no public meetings. The contention that the South African Parliament 
showed little care for the troubles of survivors with their one-time payment of 30,000 
Rand is one that cannot be laid directly at the feet of the RRC, which had recommended a 
wide range of reparations including the urgent interim reparations, individual grants, 
symbolic reparations, community rehabilitation programs and institutional reforms. 
Although mostly not implemented, this wide variety showed concern with the well-being 
of both victims and the wider society that—because of its inability to implement 
directly—may or may not have affected the RRC’s level of trustworthiness. 
Many from the international community criticize gacaca based on its procedural 
faults, most notably the lack of counsel for defendants and the minimal training given to 
the elected judges. According to Amnesty International the “competence of the gacaca 
judges is questionable” noting that their training is “grossly inadequate” and, more 
relevant to the consideration of trustworthiness, this lack of legal training may make them 
easier to manipulate by government officials and local power brokers (Amnesty 
International 2002, 38).  
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In the case of Rwanda’s gacaca courts the trustworthiness of its authorities is 
different depending on the lens used to examine it. Examining gacaca with a more 
formal, or Western, conception of trustworthiness of the authorities is problematic both 
for the RPF political leadership and for the gacaca judges themselves. Regarding judges, 
the charges brought forth by Amnesty and others that their lack of legal training may 
make the judges susceptible to manipulation by government officials, reduces one’s sense 
of their trustworthiness, as does the accusation that individual judges used their positions 
for personal gain; which, if true, violates both the judges’ trustworthiness and the sense 
that gacaca itself was a neutral forum, free from personal biases (Amnesty International 
2002). Looking through our informal folk lens gives a similar picture of the 
trustworthiness of RPF officials, namely that perception that the government is using 
gacaca to consolidate its hold on power and, at the same time, to shield themselves from 
prosecution. However, when using a local cultural lens to examine the trustworthiness of 
gacaca judges a different result appears. Arguments that gacaca judges lack legal 
competence are countered by the argument that judges have what is known as ‘contextual 
competence’ meaning that their deep understanding of the local context and the goals of 
gacaca in promoting reconciliation alongside meting out punishment call for a different 
standard for evaluating judges. Clark notes that in terms of assessing gacaca some 
communities have come together to address the issues behind the genocide and to support 
one another, while other communities have experienced an increase in tension and 
acrimony following the sessions. The key difference for Clark is that in the former cases 
there was adequate mediation from the judges that was often lacking in the latter (Clark 
2009, 317). Therefore, trustworthiness in this context has more to do with the personal 
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qualities of the judge in question, their willingness and ability to intervene in a manner 
which engages the trust of the community and less to do their level of legal acumen or 
ability to follow the rules of gacaca procedure. 
Dignity and Respect 
The definition of treatment with dignity and respect seems quite simple and 
straightforward. According to Tyler, it means that when dealing with authorities, people 
feel that “their dignity as people and members of society is recognized and 
acknowledged” (Tyler 2000, 122). Tyler further notes that since being treated politely 
and with respect are essentially unrelated to outcomes, this aspect of procedural justice is 
“especially relevant” because it affirms an individual’s status in a manner that does not 
rely upon a positive outcome to have a positive effect on perceptions of fairness (Tyler 
2000, 122). 
When examining the criterion of dignity and respect we need to examine the 
perceptions of all parties, victims and witnesses as well as the perpetrators or the accused, 
in order to determine the extent to which they felt they received adequate recognition of 
their dignity and respect. In addition we need to do this using both our Western and 
“folk” cultural lenses. Overall, we see that the TRC appears to have done a fairly good 
job in meeting the dignity and respect criterion in the case of both victims and of the 
accused, whether examined through our Western justice lens or a local, traditional lens as 
illuminated by ubuntu. Victims and survivors testifying before the HRVC were showered 
with empathy by the commissioners, especially by Archbishop Tutu, and had the 
satisfaction of acknowledgment of the serious crimes that they had suffered from 
(Graybill and Lanegran 2004, 6; Minow 1998, 71-74). The AC as well, in its own way, 
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met the criterion of being treated with dignity and respect. Defendants before the 
committee were afforded counsel and, even though they were cross examined, they were 
not required to profess contrition for their acts (Shore and Kline 2006, 316-317). This last 
point was a sore spot with many victims and some of the general public, but on the 
whole, as Govier (2002) notes, repentance cannot be demanded, nor forgiveness, but 
neither are possible without acknowledgment of the original wrong done.  
In terms of treating the victims who did testify with dignity and respect, the 
HRVC did quite well in some respects. The appointment of Archbishop Desmond Tutu as 
the chair of the commission created a space within which he infused the HRVC process 
with Christian practices drawn from local customs. From opening prayers to exhortations 
and other comments, Tutu “intentionally created an environment that fostered practices 
that bore a resemblance to recognizable ceremonial practices” (Shore and Kline 2006, 
314). In fact, the proceedings of the HRVC—the committee that Tutu chaired—differed 
greatly from the AC, with the former adhering to a “religious redemptive” formulation of 
truth while the latter concentrated on what is known as a “legal-forensic” definition of 
truth (Shore and Kline 2006, 313). Shore and Kline note that the overt use of religious 
language and symbols in the HRVC was, in fact, comforting to many of the victims and 
survivors. The role of religion in South Africa—whether the Black churches or the Dutch 
Reformed Church—has never been private nor solely concerned with the salvation and 
spiritual well being of just individuals (Shore and Kline 2006, 310, 315). The cultural 
credibility and fit of the use of religious symbolism by Archbishop Tutu and other 
members of the HRVC gave the proceedings the air of comfort and support, particularly 
with their respect for deeply-held religious values. Further, the ability of those victims 
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who were called to testify to tell their stories to a sympathetic and official audience also 
contributes to the sense that they were treated with dignity and respect, as did the lack of 
cross examination by perpetrators. While those who were excluded from giving 
testimony might have lost some sense of voice—and possibly some level of 
trustworthiness and respect for the process—evidence from studies by the Centre for the 
Study of Violence and Reconciliation showed that many who did participate likely felt 
that telling their stories in front of a respectful institutional body was the most useful part 
of the process; indicating that this criteria for procedural justice was likely met (Hamber, 
Nageng, and O'Malley 2000). 
For gacaca the criterion of being treated with dignity and respect could be said to 
have been partially met. Like the TRC, the gacaca process allowed victims and survivors 
to tell their stories in their words (Clark 2010). In addition, the accused were also 
supposed to be able to tell their stories and any member of the community was allowed to 
speak out, ask questions or make statements about the case at hand. As noted above, 
Amnesty officials assert that in the pilot phase of gacaca there were instances wherein the 
defendant’s right to speak was abrogated and that a presumption of guilt existed which, if 
true, would seriously impinge upon the defendant’s perception of treatment (Amnesty 
International 2002). However, according to Clark, this interpretation of gacaca fails to 
take into account the local view of gacaca as something more than a legal institution with 
larger aims of communal reconciliation rather than just punishment (Clark 2010, 96-97). 
It is through this local view of gacaca that we can see some measure of success, from a 
communal standpoint, of gacaca in meeting the criterion of dignity and respect. 
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Again what we see with this criterion is that the TRC’s efforts appear to be much 
more in line with satisfying a perception of treatment with dignity and respect, whether 
viewed from a formal perspective or through the folk perspective of ubuntu. By contrast, 
gacaca again only meets this criterion partially, and only if we view gacaca through a folk 
lens where communal good outweighs individual rights. Unfortunately, the other 
indictments of gacaca covered above do much to mitigate this communal good and to 
make it appear to be more in the service of the government than of individual 
communities. 
Opportunity for Voice 
In Tyler’s research, participation, or the opportunity for voice, is a key element of 
procedural justice. He notes that individuals “feel more fairly treated if they are allowed 
to participate…by presenting their suggestions about what should be done” (Tyler 2000, 
121). This power is the key that motivates alternative dispute resolution processes like 
mediation, but is not limited to arenas where individuals believe that their process 
participation will affect outcome. Tyler and his colleagues indicate that there is a value 
for people even when their influence is noninstrumental. In these cases the impact of 
being able to give voice and be listened to attentively reinforce an individual’s sense of 
self-esteem and personal worth (Lind, Tyler, and Huo 1997, 769; Tyler 1987, 343). Like 
treatment with respect, the opportunity for voice is something that can be incorporated 
into many different fora; but unlike treatment with respect, the opportunity for voice may 
be harder to implement, particularly in fora that are based on more formal conceptions of 
procedural justice, such as court settings that allow for only limited participation by 
victims or defendants (Mertus 2000). 
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The TRC sought to incorporate the narratives of all who testified before it, 
whether they were victims and survivors or applicants for amnesty. Whether examined 
from a formal or folk conception of procedural justice, it appears that the opportunity for 
voice was met for all who sat before the HRVC or the AC. However, this opportunity for 
voice was lessened somewhat in terms of the HRVC’s selection process for those who 
gave it testimony. Although it was not possible for all to tell their stories, there were just 
too many and the process for choosing who would appear and who would not was less 
than transparent. So too was the process for determining who would appear before the 
AC, which was problematic because of a lack of equal opportunity for applicants in 
prison to make their best case to the committee. 
The HRVC was the most visible committee and conducted its work throughout 
the country, holding around eighty hearings across the country where victims were called 
to tell their stories. Following this the commission investigated a number of “significant” 
or representative cases to gather more detail. Unfortunately, with over 22,000 cases 
brought forth by victims or their families, the commission was unable to investigate, or 
even highlight them all (van der Merwe 2003, 106). What this meant was that, despite 
commendable outreach to the populace, the HRVC’s consultations with communities 
were usually quite limited and the process of taking testimony in one location might last 
only a single day. Further, the TRC retained control over the selection of cases for public 
testimony, at times selecting cases more for their dramatic effect or notoriety; and in 
effect reducing the level of control that victims might have felt within the process (van 
der Merwe 2003, 111). This meant that victims who applied to the TRC had an unequal 
opportunity to give public testimony, though the commission summarized all of victim 
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statements in a “victim’s volume” (South Africa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
and Tutu 1998, 576-577). Despite all of this, the cultural lens put forth by ubuntu may 
have lessened the impact of selectivity for the HRVC if those who were not able to testify 
felt that the stories that were told represented them in some way and, more importantly, 
assisted the country at large towards reconciliation. 
The gacaca process was designed to allow the maximum amount of voice for all 
participants through the purported ability of all present to give testimony or to ask 
questions. However, when viewed through a formal procedural justice lens we can see 
that the exclusion of RPF and Tutsi crimes lessened the amount of possible voice for 
those who had been their victims. The perception of victor’s justice lowers the level of 
voice and opportunity for participation, perhaps endangering gacaca’s goal of 
engendering reconciliation in Rwanda. However, when we limit ourselves to the process 
within gacaca instead of its institutional constraints we find, especially when looking 
through our folk lens, that the opportunity for voice is relatively strong with some 
exceptions (Clark 2010). These are, namely the early reports that Clark points to wherein 
defendants were not given equal opportunity to speak and the Amnesty International 
reports that defendants and witnesses were harangued (Amnesty International 2002; 
Clark 2009).  
Still, despite the fact that actual participation in gacaca is lower than indicated by 
many of its proponents, Clark argues that gacaca has “unquestionably” afforded the 
population a “rare opportunity” to participate in Rwanda’s national reconstruction and 
rebuilding processes (Clark 2010, 153). Furthermore, he argues that it has empowered 
many marginalized groups, such as women and youth, and has the potential expand 
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participation if the planned extension of gacaca to everyday crimes after the genocide 
cases are complete takes place (Clark 2010, 153). 
Overall it appears that both processes have had some success in providing the 
opportunity for voice, though not without some criticisms. Examining both gacaca and 
the TRC through a local conception of procedural justice expands our ability to see 
potential opportunities for voice in the sense of being able to tell one’s story to a 
sympathetic audience at the TRC or engage in a messy dialog about issues critical to 
individual and communal well-being in gacaca. Expanding beyond the formal view of 
procedural justice allows us to see these positive elements while recognizing that each 
process still has its shortcomings. 
 
Conclusion 
Our initial question of whether a nexus of procedural justice and cultural context 
could tell us more about why some transitional justice mechanisms are seen as more 
successful than others has only been partially answered. Rettig’s analysis of gacaca in 
Sovu province showed that confidence in the process fell from 51 percent in 2006 to 38 
percent in 2008 while 65 percent indicated that they had confidence in gacca, rising to 67 
percent in 2008 (Rettig 2008, 37). These findings are similar to Clark’s data, which 
indicate that support for gacaca is generally strong, but that participation has fluctuated 
based on security concerns, economic need and on interest in specific aspects of 
individual cases (Clark 2010, 148). By contrast, Gibson’s data shows a steady support for 
the work of the TRC, even though there is evidence of anger and disappointment in the 
lack of reparations made by South Africa’s government (Gibson 2002, 2005). These 
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findings are similar to our analysis of procedural justice criteria for these two cases, 
finding some support for the argument that higher levels of procedural justice—defined 
either formally or locally—corresponds to others’ findings of more support for the 
transitional justice mechanism in question. Gibson’s findings of higher support for the 
work of the HRVC than the AC correlates with our findings that the HRVC paid more 
heed to the procedural justice needs of victims than did the AC, which focused its 
procedures more on the perpetrators. Likewise, Rettig’s findings of initial high levels of 
support for gacaca that later fell correspond to our analysis that shows that while some 
attention was paid to procedural justice criteria at the local level, this was undermined by 
decisions at the national level which undercut gacaca’s perceived neutrality and 
independence from the political process (Rettig 2008, 40). 
Turning in more detail to the TRC, we note a series of processes that have an 
interesting mix of success in terms of procedural justice as viewed both formally and 
locally. The HRVC seems to have had the most inventive use of local conceptions of 
procedural justice through its use of the ubuntu worldview to characterize both its 
approach to its witnesses and position on the role of reconciliation (cf Coertze 2001; 
Krog 2008b, 2008a; Marx 2002). In doing so, it fulfilled an informal conception of the 
criteria for voice and participation for those who testified, as well as trustworthiness, 
dignity and respect. By contrast the AC’s reliance upon a more formal conception of 
procedural justice may have been wise from a legal perspective, but when viewed 
through an informal, ubuntu-based, conception of procedural justice, it left many in South 
Africa with a sense that the amnesty process was unfair to victims (Gibson 2002, 2005). 
This sense of unfairness may be best characterized by Krog, who argued that it was not 
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the failure of retributive justice that created anger at the amnesty process, but the failure 
of those who were granted amnesty to abide by the tenets of ubuntu, washing their hands 
of the forgiveness that they had received and not acknowledging their interconnectedness 
with the victims that angered many South Africans (Krog 2008a, 218-219). Despite this, 
the AC did largely fulfill formal criteria for neutrality of the forum and, despite problems 
of access, opportunity for voice. The only clear indicator of failure for the TRC is the 
failure to date of the RRC to provide what is viewed as adequate levels of restitution for 
those who suffered under Apartheid. However, the discontent that this has generated 
might be more directed at the Parliament than the TRC as a whole—because in the end it 
was the Parliament’s decision to alter the RRC’s recommendations. 
As with the TRC, Rwanda’s gacaca courts do well in meeting some aspects of 
procedural justice criteria and poorly in others. When examined through an informal 
procedural justice lens, gacaca appears to have higher levels of opportunity for voice and 
participation, as well as, theoretically, high levels for trustworthiness of the authorities—
given that they come from the local region. However, more formal conceptions for 
trustworthiness, treatment with dignity and respect, and opportunity for voice show that, 
by Western standards, the lack of legal training for judges, the lack of legal counsel for 
defendants and the willingness of the gacaca courts to admit hearsay evidence creates 
problems for the international community. Despite this, gacaca has continued to receive 
some support, though declining, from Rwandans; indicating that the view of procedural 
justice adopted by the tribunals resonates at some levels with the population. 
Unfortunately, both for Rwanda and gacaca, the neutrality of the forum has been 
compromised both formally and locally by the government’s decision not to allow 
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charges to be brought against RPF or former RPF members, tainting the courts with the 
perception that they are merely offering victors’ justice. The question of how much 
damage this perception will have on Rwanda’s ability to achieve some level of 
reconciliation is uncertain at this time, but it seems likely that this choice will breed 
resentment that may taint future communal relations. 
We would be remiss if we failed to note that the findings with regards to the use 
of procedural justice as a measurement of success or failure of specific transitional justice 
mechanisms must be taken with a few grains of salt. Just as we caution against viewing 
procedural justice criteria only through the lens of formal processes and Western justice, 
we should also caution against adopting informal cultural conceptions wholesale. It 
seems relatively clear from the mixed records in each of our cases that there are those 
who are relatively satisfied with the work that these institutions have done, and in 
particular, the manner in which they have done it. But there are also many who 
disapprove of the restorative nature of the TRC and of gacaca, feeling that their needs for 
justice have been abrogated and that attempts to achieve reconciliation have only brought 
more pain (Oppelt 1998; Wilson 2001; Kayigamba 2009). While it is useful to examine 
procedural justice through multiple lenses along the notion of legal pluralism, it is also 
useful to highlight where perceptions of procedural justice diverge as well as where they 
converge. 
As a final note, we must pay attention to the fact that this is a preliminary study 
that has explored a possibility for examining transitional justice mechanisms using well-
recognized criteria from the field of procedural justice and incorporating ideas about how 
these criteria might be viewed in different cultural and contextual settings. In order to test 
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these propositions more fully it is necessary to do several things. The first of these would 
be to either conduct field research or a field experiment, or to rely upon much more 
primary data than was available for this paper. This is needed in order to collect 
information that is more precise and focused on the criteria of procedural justice rather 
than having to extract information from multiple sources or to extrapolate from existing 
materials. The second recommendation is to attempt to study multiple transitional justice 
mechanisms in a single cultural context as an attempt to minimize the variation that exists 
between cultural settings.  
Overall we believe that this research provides a way to show that not only are 
there many mechanisms available to implement transitional justice, but there are many 
methods of measuring that justice; methods which are not limited to formal conceptions 
of procedure or established methods of punishment. Allowing for this diversity in justice 
and how we view it only gives more options to those who face the hard questions and the 
hard choices of how to address the human rights violations of a former regime. 
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